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TRASHING THE GERMAN ADVANTAGE
John H. Langbein*
The conduct of civil litigation in Continental legal systems differs
markedly from the Anglo-American tradition, although the differences
should not obscure the fundamental similarity that both are adversary
systems. In Continental systems lawyers for the litigants play important
roles in formulating their clients' positions, nominating lines of factual
inquiry, and overseeing the work of the court.1 The greatest difference
between the two traditions is the allocation of responsibility for identifying and investigating disputed issues of fact. In our procedure, the adversaries gather potential proofs in out-of-court pretrial discovery
proceedings; and if the case resists settlement, the adversaries select and
adduce proofs at trial. In Continental practice, by contrast, the court
determines the sequence for investigating issues of fact; and, subject to
adversary oversight, the court examines witnesses. Our distinction between pretrial and trial is unknown; rather, a European court investigates and adjudicates in discontinuous hearings, as many as the case
requires.
In The German Advantage2 I had three objectives. First, I wanted
to make available a concise account of the main attributes of the Continental system that I know something about, the West German. Sometimes even the first principles of German procedure take AngloAmerican audiences by surprise, although there is a large English-language literature on the subject (not to mention the vast corpus of German-language reports, treatises, and scholarly monographs surrounding
the German code of civil procedure). I came to suspect that the literature was perhaps too large and scattered, and that a work of summary
might fill a need. Accordingly, in a 43-page article, I undertook to describe the salient features of German civil procedure.
Beyond description, the article had the further purpose of highlighting the main advantages that arise from the German tradition of judicial
control of fact-gathering: (1) By having the trier control the sequence of
fact-gathering, the Germans are able to minimize unproductive investigation; in contrast, our division between pretrial discovery and trial pro* Max Pam Professor of American and Foreign Law, University of Chicago Law School.
1 The importance of counsel in the judge-dominated German system is a recurrent theme in
Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 823, 824 & n.4, 834-35,
841-42, 844-45 (1985) [hereinafter The Gernan Advantage].
2 Id.
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vides incentives for excessive search.3 (2) By having the court examine
the witnesses, the Germans prevent lawyers from having pretrial contact
with nonparty witnesses, thereby precluding the coaching of witnesses
that disfigures our civil justice.4 (3) The Germans employ neutral experts whose duty is to aid the court in finding the truth, in contrast to the
litigation-biased expert witnesses that American lawyers recruit and pay
5
to bolster preordained results.
Having pointed to these advantages, the article warned that the
greater responsibility of the bench for the conduct of civil proceedings in
Germany entails risks of its own. Thus, the article discussed how the
twin safeguards of a professionalized judiciary 6 and a stunningly liberal
right of appellate review 7 provide the needed correctives.
My third objective in The German Advantage was to direct attention
from a comparative perspective to the rise of American managerial judging.8 Complex litigation has required us to superimpose upon our lawyer-driven procedure a growing component of judicial management,
including judicial involvement in identifying issues, promoting settlement, and sequencing investigation. These techniques are strongly reminiscent of German-style procedure. I observed that it is awkward to
reconcile our new practice of managerial judging with our traditional
theory of party domination of fact-gathering. 9 I cautioned that we have
not yet adequately addressed the need to devise safeguards appropriate to
the burgeoning judicial power over the pretrial process. 10
The German Advantage has become the foil for the paper"1 that appears in the previous pages of this journal. On a host of points, the Critique seriously misrepresents both the substance of The German
Advantage and the reality of German procedure. Accordingly, this is a
paper whose sad errand is to show how the Critique has distorted The
German Advantage. I cannot at reasonable length chase down every
twisted meaning or reply to every tweak, but I do undertake in this paper
to respond to enough of the Critique to show that it is thoroughly
untrustworthy.
The scathing tone of the Critique will have alerted readers to the
likelihood that something is amiss. Much of the Critique is commonplace adversarial counterpunching, but longish portions purport to use
3 Id. at 830-32.
4 Id. at 833-35.

5 Id. at 835-41.
6 Id. at 848-55.
7 Id. at 855-57.
8 Id. at 825, 841, 858-66.
9 Id. at 825, 865-66.
10 Id. at 861.
11 Allen, K6ck, Reichenberg & Rosen, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea for
More Details and Fewer Generalitiesin ComparativeScholarship, 82 Nw. U.L. REv.- (1988) [hereinafter Critique].

HeinOnline -- 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 764 1987-1988

Trashing the German Advantage

82:763 (1988)

German-language materials to discredit conventional views about German civil procedure. It is remarkable, therefore, that Ronald Allen, the
Critique's mastermind, is illiterate in German. He engaged a couple of
German-speaking students who were passing through Northwestern Law
School last year to serve as seeing-eyes for the German sources, and he
affiliated them as co-authors. Experienced scholars understand why that
is an imprudent method of conducting research in comparative law.12
I.

THE BIG CASE

"Langbein limits his comparison to the 'traditional bipolar lawsuit
in contract, tort, or entitlement,'" the Critique asserts, "and explicitly
excludes from the analysis the 'Big Case.' "13 I said no such thing. The
passage that the Critique misrenders appears inthe introduction to The
German Advantage, where I explain that although latter-day American
managerial judging originated in complex cases and marks a point of
convergence between the two traditions, my discussion will not be limited to managerial judging. The passage reads in full:
I should emphasize, however, that the main concern of this, article is not the
sprawling Big Case, but the traditional bipolar lawsuit in contract, tort, or
entitlement. The Big Case is testing and instructive but quantitatively unimportant. Ordinary litigation is the place to compare and to judge civil
procedural systems. 14
In the concluding portion of The German Advantage that is devoted to
American managerial judging, I discuss how the Big Case techniques enshrined in the Manualfor Complex Litigation15 have seeped into the federal procedure for ordinary litigation, 16 and I explain why the Manual
looks "'proto-Germanic' in the eyes of the comparative lawyer .... -17
Despite my recurrent attention to the Big Case, the Critique accuses
me of "explicitly exclud[ing] from the analysis the 'Big Case.'-18
12 The more central unreadable sources are to an inquiry, the less likely that someone who cannot read them is fit to conduct that inquiry. A well-motivated scholar, lacking the language that a
project requires, might associate himself with a master of the subject-in this instance, for example,
with a seasoned authority on German civil procedure. But for reasons that will be clear enough to
anybody who reads this rebuttal, no authority on German procedure would have been willing to
subscribe to the misrepresentations that the Critiquepresents.
13 Critique,supra note 11, text at note 12; see also id., text following note 17 (The "argument
purports to be limited to the 'little case,' whereas in fact it is more telling if directed to the Big
Case.").
14 The German Advantage, supra note 1, at 825.
15 MANUAL FOR C.MPLEX LITIGATION (5th ed. 1982).
16 The German Advantage, supra note 1, at 858-59.
17 Id. at 859.
18 Critique, supra note 11, text at note 12. Elsewhere in The German Advantage I cautioned
readers against confining its message to the Big Case:
In emphasizing the Big Case as the origin of managerial judging in American procedure, I
do not mean to imply that I think that managerial judging ought to be confined there. To the
contrary, I agree with the point that Hein Kitz has long asserted [citation omitted], that the

765 ,
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II.

COACHING WITNESSES

Why does the Critique attribute to me the palpably spurious view
that my argument is "limited to the 'little case' "?19 A partial answer is
that the Critique wishes to trivialize, and thus sidestep, one of the main
contentions of The German Advantage.
The German Advantage emphasizes the profound enhancement in
accuracy that the German system achieves by having the court rather
than the adversaries conduct the initial examination of nonparty witnesses. 20 German procedure operates without any trace of the partisan
preparation of witnesses that is so endemic to our legal system. I quoted
a little of Judge Jerome Frank's famous warning about the coaching of
witnesses in American practice. 21 The Critique's authors denigrate
Judge Frank. 22 I might as easily have pointed to Judge Marvin Frankel's
recent account:
[E]very trial lawyer knows that the "preparing" of witnesses may embrace a
multitude of other measures, including some ethical lapses believed to be
more common than we would wish. The process is labeled archly in law[T]he process often exyer's slang as "horseshedding" the witness ....
moves in the
tends beyond helping organize what the witness knows,
2 3 and
direction of helping the witness to know new things.
There can be no principled defense of coaching, and the Critique
offers none. Testimony that is rehearsed and molded by adversaries is
materially less trustworthy than testimony that is free of such influences.
However, the Critique contrives to wish away some of the force of this
powerful truth by ascribing to me the view that American procedural
shortcomings are characteristic of "little cases," then purporting to wonder whether "little cases" are lucrative enough to induce lawyers to
spend time coaching witnesses. 24
The Critique returns to the subject of coaching a few pages later,
employing a recurrent stratagem: demanding nonexisting empirical data
and implying that only scholars who conduct social-scientific empirical
investigation can speak to issues of comparative civil procedure. The
"criticisms [in The German Advantage] of the coached witness ... are
difficult to appraise," says the Critique, "because [the] argument is somewhat speculative. No data concerning the extent of the problem are proGerman advantage in civil procedure is at its greatest in the Small Case, where the costliness of
adversary fact-gathering is intolerable.
The German Advantage, supra note 1, at 862 n.138.
19 Critique, supra note 11, text following note 17. Despite the quote marks on 'little case,' the
term is not mine.
20 The German Advantage, supra note 1, at 833-35.
21 Id. at 833 (quotingJ. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUsTICE 86 (1949)).
22 The Critique does so in a shabby footnote: Critique,supra note 11, at note 14.
23 M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 15 (1980).
24 Critique, supra note 11, text preceding note 16.
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vided, nor is any reason given why these assertions should be accepted on
faith."' 25 There is, of course, no extant data on either the extent of coaching or the levels of prevarication achieved. It could as easily be argued
that in designing rules of criminal procedure we need not worry about
convicting the innocent, since nobody has adequate data on how many
innocent are convicted. The Critique's authors do not deny the point
that is emphasized in The German Advantage-that our system of partisan preparation of witnesses facilitates coaching. Rather, they employ a
debater's trick (Where's your unobtainable data on frequency?) in order
to conceal the force of the point. I reiterate: (1) Judges Frank and Frankel are correct that American trial lawyers persistently coach witnesses;
(2) coaching is profoundly truth-defeating; and (3) the German system is
devoid of it.
The Critique's attachment to empiricism is skin-deep. The Critique's authors demand empirical scholarship from others, but feel free
to employ nonempirical argumentation when it suits their fancy. Thus,
in a further try at wriggling off the hook on the matter of coaching, the
Critique asserts that "the German system may be moving toward ours
...
"26 This statement is an egregious error, and it is instructive to see
how the Critique got there.
In The German Advantage I explain why a German lawyer will
virtually never... have occasion for out-of-court contact with a witness.
Not only would such contact be a serious ethical breach, it would be selfdefeating. "German judges are given to marked and explicit doubts about
the reliability of the testimony of witnesses who previously have discussed
27
the case with counsel or who have consorted unduly with a party."
The passage quoted within this extract comes from a great English-language mini-treatise on German civil procedure written by Benjamin
Kaplan, Arthur T. von Mehren, and Rudolf Schaefer, which appeared in
1958.28 In my supporting footnote, I note that the distinguished German
professor of comparative law, Hein Krtz, spoke in a similar vein in an
article published in 1982.29 My footnote discloses, as convention requires, that language quoted by Krtz derived from the 1957 version of
30
the German Bar Association's ethical standard.
The Critique responds to this material by ignoring the context in
25 Id., text at note 68 (footnote omitted). The Critique'snote 68 faults me for not consulting
"psychological literature on memory," while confessing that the literature is "not perfectly consistent" on the proposition that the Critique wants to extract from it-that is, that witnesses are not
"easily manipulated by lawyers." Id.
26 Critique,supra note 11, text following note 79.
27 The German Advantage, supra note 1, at 834 (quoting Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer,
Phases of German Civil Procedure,71 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1201 (1958))thereinafter KAPLAN-VON
MEHREN].
28 KAPLAN-VON MEHREN, supra note 27, at 1443.

29 The German Advantage, supra note 1, at 834 n.33.
30 Id.
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which K6tz mentioned the German Bar Association's ethical standardnamely, the insistence by this great modem German authority that German lawyers continue to avoid pretrial contact with witnesses today, just
as in the day of the Kaplan-von Mehren-Schaefer article. 31 The Critique
notices that a later version of the German Bar Association ethical standard changes some of the wording of the 1957 provision that allows outof-court contact with witnesses in cases of unusual necessity. 32 The Critique then declares "these revisions" to be evidence "that the German
system may be moving toward ours ....

33

Ever ready to fault others for the lack of real world empirical data,
the Critique is unable to point to a single instance in which an out-ofcourt contact has occurred between a nonparty witness and a German
lawyer. And if one could be found, it would be noteworthy for its extreme rarity. Nevertheless, the authors discern that the Germans are
"moving toward" the American practice. The truth is (for the reasons
explained in The German Advantage as well as in the earlier Kaplan-von
Mehren-Schaefer and Kbtz articles) that German procedure strongly discourages out-of-court contact between lawyers and witnesses. Coaching
is American, not German. In denying these points, the Critique misrepresents the reality of both legal systems.
III.

JUDICIAL CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATION

The German Advantage summarizes the allocation of responsibility
for investigating disputes of fact in German procedure:
Unlike an American complaint .

.

. the German [complaint] proposes

means of proof for its main factual contentions. The major documents in
the plaintiff's possession that support his claim are scheduled and often
appended; other documents (for example, hospital files or government
records such as police accident reports or agency files) are indicated; witnesses who are thought to know something helpful to the plaintiff's position
are identified. The defendant's answer follows the same pattern. It should
be emphasized, however, that neither plaintiff's nor defendant's lawyer will
have conducted any significant search for witnesses or for other evidence
unknown
to his client. Digging for facts is primarily the work of'the
34
judge.
The supporting footnote refers readers to the Kaplan-von Mehren-Schaefer article for further "English-language discussion of this point" that
digging for facts is primarily the work of the judge, since the phenomenon "is so striking to those of us bred in the Anglo-American
35
tradition."
31 The German Advantage, supra note 1, at 834 n.33 (quoting Ktz, Civil Litigation and the
Public Interest, 1 Civ. JusT. Q. 237, 241 (1982)).
32 Critique,supra note 11, text at note 77.
33 Id., text following note 79.
34 The German Advantage, supra note 1, at 827.
35 Id. at 827 n.12.
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The Critique insists, however, that the German judge's role "does
not include anything like 'digging for facts.' "36 In drawing this conclusion, the Critiqueconfuses the elementary difference, captured in the paragraph from The German Advantage reproduced above, between
identifying sources and investigating matters of fact. "Rather than 'digging for facts,'" says the Critique, "the court is bound by what the parties advance."' 37 The authors ignore reality in suggesting that adversary
control of the scope of the lawsuit undercuts the court's responsibility to
investigate disputed facts. English-language readers should consult the
recent account by K6tz, which notes some of the investigative steps open
to the judge, such as gathering official fies and appointing an expert.
Kotz summarizes the matter thus: "In other words, the court may look
for the truth beyond the confines of the evidence offered by the parties."' 38 (Judicial responsibility for examining witnesses, the other aspect
of the German system in which it is helpful to understand that "digging
for facts is primarily the work of the judge," is discussed in Part V
below.)
No amount of word play in the Critique should obscure the simple
truth that in German civil procedure partisan nomination yields to judicial investigation of the proofs.
IV.

SURPRISE

The German Advantage discusses the judicial responsibility for developing the proofs. The article emphasizes two features that are noteworthy from the comparative standpoint, and the Critique denies neither.
First, the court determines the sequence in which it will investigate the
issues. 39 Second, the court examines any witnesses, subject to adversary
oversight and supplementary questioning. 4°
From the standpoint of efficiency, an important attribute of German
procedure is the discontinuous hearing system, which limits investigation
to the most important issues still unresolved. The court ranges over the
case, "constantly looking for the jugular-for the issue of law or fact that
might dispose of the case."' 4 1 In a crucial passage that the Critique pretends to rebut, The German Advantage explains that the danger of surprise inherent in the Anglo-American pretrial/trial distinction prevents
us from organizing fact-gathering in a comparable fashion:
Part of what makes our discovery system so complex is that, on account of our division into pretrial and trial, we have to discover for the
entire case. We investigate everything that could possibly come up at trial,
36 Critique, supra note 11, text preceeding note 82.
37 Id., text at note 85.

38 K6tz, supra note 31, at 239.
39 The German Advantage, supra note 1, at 830-32.
40 Id. at 834-35.

41 Id. at 830.
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because once we enter the trial phase we can seldom go back and search for
further evidence. By contrast, the episodic character of German fact-gathering largely eliminates the danger of surprise; if the case takes an unexpected turn, the disadvantaged litigant can count on developing his
response in another hearing at a later time. Because there is no pretrial
discovery phase, fact-gathering occurs only once; and because the court establishes the sequence of fact-gathering according to criteria of relevance,
unnecessary investigation is minimized. 42
The Critique replies that
Langbein is wrong on the law. There is a well developed body of law concerning surprise in the United States, and "the potential for surprise witnesses who cannot be rebutted in time" is not terribly great.... In most

jurisdictions, a continuance of the trial or43hearing will be granted, or on
occasion the witness's testimony excluded.
This assertion is nonsense. The cases cited"4 in support of it deal with
the dramatically different matter of pretrial misbehavior, such as concealing or misdescribing a witness in violation of the discovery rules.
The existence of a remedy in misconduct cases is simply irrelevant
to the concern about the structure of the discovery system that is stressed
in the extract from The German Advantage reproduced above. Any civilized legal system provides a remedy for surprise by trick, but that remedy is for the extraordinary case. The usual way of preventing surprise in
our civil procedure is, as the extracted passage from The German Advantage says, "to discover for the entire case." The structural problem of
Anglo-American civil procedure results from what comparative lawyers
call the principle of concentration. 4 5 We require the trial to be a single
continuous event, as opposed to the series of discontinuous hearings employed in Continental adjudication. The crucial point that the Critique
cannot controvert is that "once we enter the trial phase we can seldom go
back and search for further evidence." '4 6 Unless the authors of the Critique wish to assert that an Anglo-American lawyer would face no obstacles in waiting until trial to conduct discovery (a course of conduct that
would ordinarily amount to legal malpractice), their argument is
specious.
42 Id. at 831 (footnote omitted).
43 Critique,supra note 11, text following note 65.
44 Id., at n.67.
45 See the brilliant exposition of this point by Arthur T. von Mehren, The Significancefor Procedural Practice and Theory of the Concentrated Trial: Comparative Remarks, 2 EuROPAISCHES
RECHTSDENKEN IN GESCHICHTE UND GEGENWART: FESTSCHRIFr FOR HELMUT COING 361 (N.

Horn ed. 1982); see id. at 362-64 for discussion of the danger of surprise as the driving force behind
our discovery system.
46 The German Advantage, supra note 1, at 831. The passage from which this language is taken
is quoted in full, supra text and note 39.
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V.

EXAMINING WrrINEssEs

On the subject of the German court examining witnesses, the Critique reverses field. Necessarily admitting that the court does the examining (which is, of course, a main component of what was meant when I
said that "[d]igging for facts is primarily the work of the judge" 47), the
Critiquecomplains that the court does the job badly. The authors lament
that "unfortunately the German system has not been subjected to the
intense scrutiny of trained empiricists at anywhere near the level at
which Americans have scrutinized their own system." Nevertheless,
they exult in having "discovered one remarkable study of the hearing
48
process in a German civil court, and its implications are troubling."
The "remarkable study" is a paper by Beatrice Caesar-Wolf, published in an obscure journal,4 9 that contains some verbatim extracts from
the examination of two witnesses in a single hearing. Also reprinted is
the judge's succinct official summary of the essentials gleaned from the
examination. The Critique, after quoting some of this material, announces: "As Caesar-Wolf observed, the judge has created the testimony
he wanted, fashioning very definite testimony out of considerably more
ambiguous initial testimony." 50 I urge readers to reexamine the portion
of the Critique in which the authors republish the verbatim, 5 1 in order to
judge for themselves whether that damning description even remotely
captures the event. A better description of the dialogue is that it is an
innocuous exchange in which a judge encourages a witness to be more
precise by probing the circumstances that the witness volunteers.
This "remarkable study" is indeed remarkable-for the audacity of
basing supposedly empirical conclusions upon a single instance. What
Ronald Allen and his associates call empiricism is what empiricists call
47 The German Advantage, supra note 1, at 827; see supra note 31, where this passage is quoted

in context.
48 Critique,supra note 11, text following note 109.
49 Caesar-Wolf, The Constructionof "Adjudicable'Evidence in a West German Civil Hearing,4

TEXT 193 (1984) (on fie with the NORTHWESTERN UNIvERsrrY LAW REviEw). Neither the
Northwestern University nor University of Chicago library systems could produce the journal; the
Critique authors supplied a photocopy.
50 Critique,supranote 11, text following note 114. Actually, Caesar-Wolf grinds a very different
axe from the one that the Critique seeks to wield. Judicial fact-finding presupposes that there is an
objectively correct version of "the facts"-that is, what actually happened. Caesar-Wolf disputes
that premise:
We do not share the empiricist notion underlying most psychological studies of witness testimony, according to which 'truth' is the exact mirror of some external reality in the sensory
perception, memory and verbal reproduction of the witness. Therefore, we are not interested in
the question central to these psychological studies of whether the testimony brings to light or
distorts the original events in question.
Caesar-Wolf, supra note 49, at 194 (footnote omitted). The authors of the Critique do not endorse
this rubbish, yet they borrow language and conclusions that Caesar-Wolf formulated in supposed
demonstration of her nihilist view of fact-finding.
51 Critique, supra note 11, text at notes 113-14.
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sampling error. Thousands of German civil hearings occur every day,
and by law 52 every one is open to the public. An author who relies upon
a sample of one when a sample of millions is available is not engaged in
empirical research as the term is ordinarily understood.
Equally remarkable is that the Critique disregards the adversarial
safeguard, discussed in The GermanAdvantage, designed to deter judicial
arbitrariness in examining a witness or in recording witness testimony:
Witness testimony is seldom recorded verbatim; rather, the judge pauses
from time to time to dictate a summary of the testimony into the dossier.
The lawyers sometimes suggest improvements in the wording of these summaries, in order
to preserve or to emphasize nuances important to one side
53
or the other.
Lawyers commonly participate in summarizing witness testimony. I
have observed it repeatedly in German courtrooms. English-language
readers should consult the Kaplan-von Mehren-Schaefer article for a
comparable account, which concludes that "the witness or the lawyers
may suggest changes [in the judge's suggested summary]. If there should
be objection to the summary as the court finally formulates it, the objec'5 4
tion would also be entered in the minutes, but this rarely happens."
The reason it rarely happens is that the judge has every incentive not to
misrender party testimony in circumstances in which his misconduct
would be entered in the record for appellate review. As is so often the
case in German procedure, the presence of adversaries, coupled with liberal appellate review, deters misconduct. The failure of counsel to object
to what Caesar-Wolf treats as a misrendering of the witness's testimony
strongly suggests that the affected party did not view the testimony as
misrendered.
The portion of the Critique concerning examination of witnesses
concludes by castigating German civil procedure for "the elimination of
troubling lapses in the witness' memory and... suppressing data inconsistent with the judge's conclusions. It is no wonder, then, that the appellate process can be swift and efficient if it only considers the material
presented to it by a single advocate-in this case, the judge."'55 We have
in this purple passage a triple distortion: (1) the fallacy of basing deviant
conclusions about the operation of a foreign procedural system upon a
one-in-millions sample; (2) the refusal to mention, much less give due
weight to, the adversary safeguards that strongly discourage the abuses
that the Critique treats as normal; and (3) the claim that only the firstinstance judge may shape the dossier, whereas in truth counsel for the
52 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (Court Organization Code) § 169 (court proceedings are public).
53 The German Advantage, supra note 1, at 828.
54 Kaplan-von Mehren, supra note 27, at 1236 (footnote omitted) (citing Zivilprozessordund)
(Code of Civil Procedure) § 162.
55 Critique,supra note 11, text following note 119.
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affected parties have ample opportunity to shape the record and to preserve objections to it.
VI.

THE EXOGENOUS AGENDA

The book review that faults an author for not having written the
book that the reviewer would have written is a staple. The authors of the
Critique have dipped into that genre to fault The German Advantage for
not conducting a comparative study of the rules of privilege and fishing.
A.

Privileges

In describing the sources of dispatch in German civil procedure, I
observed in The German Advantage that the German system "functions
without the main chapters of our law of evidence, those rules (such as
hearsay) that exclude probative evidence for fear of the inability of the
trier of fact to evaluate the evidence purposively." 56 Accordingly, "evidentiary shortcomings that would affect admissibility in our law affect
weight or credit in German law." 57 Solely as a qualification to this point,
I remarked that "German law exhibits expansive notions of testimonial
58
privilege, especially for potential witnesses drawn from the family."
The Critique faults my article for not exploring the German law of
privilege more fully. The Critique describes some of the rules and concludes that "without more careful study of [the German law of privilege]
in practice we are unable to say whether it is a 'superior' methodology or
whether it is as Byzantine as it seems." 59 The quotation marks around
the word "superior" imply that I called the German privileges "superior," whereas in truth I said no such thing. The Critique refutes its own
invention. The Critique is characteristically truculent and one-sided in
calling the German law of privilege "Byzantine" and denouncing it for
impeding investigation (which, of course, it is meant to do), without acknowledging the admirable purposes that motivate rules of privilege, especially those affecting spouses and family members: the promotion of
familial intimacy and professional trust.
The important point about the rules of privilege for present purposes
is that they bear no intrinsic relationship to the main subject of The German Advantage, which is the comparison of lawyer-driven versus judgedriven fact-gathering. American law has many privileges, although
fewer than German law. The scope that a legal system assigns to privileges for prized relationships is a relatively autonomous issue. In principle, for example, either the Germans or the Americans could adopt the
56
57
58
59

The German Advantage, supra note 1, at 829.
Id.
Id.
Critique, supra note 11, text following note 133.
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other's rules of privilege without making any other alterations in their
respective procedural systems.
B.

Fishing

A similar line of reasoning, clearly set forth in The German Advantage, led me to exclude from the article the subject of "fishing" for evidence. German civil procedure imposes higher standards of relevance in
identifying the evidence to be gathered than does the American procedure. Hence, the German consensus is hostile to fishing. The Critiqueis
hostile to the German position. 60 There are important values on both
sides of the issue. American-style fishing is costly and disruptive; it lends
itself to abuse, especially because we have been unable to attach cost
sanctions to anything but the most egregious misuses. On the other
hand, very broad discovery enriches the proofs in some cases.
Germans are not alone in thinking that Americans have got the balance wrong. The English are as hostile to fishing as the Germans. 6 1 Distinguished American jurists have also voiced disquiet. Justice Powell's
dissent from the 1980 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure illustrates the depth of the concern. "The present Rules ...invite
discovery of such scope and duration that district judges often cannot
keep the practice within reasonable bounds. . . . One must doubt
whether empirical evidence would demonstrate that untrammeled discovery actually contributes to the just resolution of disputes." 62
The German Advantage is about the virtues of having judges rather
than lawyers conduct whatever fact-gathering the system permits. Accordingly, The German Advantage explains why the debate about fishing
bears no integral relation to the great divide between Anglo-American
and Continental procedure: "The choice between adversarial and judicial conduct of fact-gathering need not correlate strongly with the level
of search achieved in a legal system. Factors unrelated to that choice,
such as the clarity of the substantive law or the attitude toward fishing,
will influence the levels of search."' 63 The Critique ignores this straightforward account of why the article is not devoted to the topic, while
delivering a one-sided endorsement of our hugely controversial American
practice.
60 Id., text at notes 141-46.
61 See generally, J. LEVINE,

DISCOVERY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN

CIVIL DISCOVERY LAW WITH REFORM PROPOSALS (1982), which criticizes the English system but

admits that the English decision to protect "the peace and privacy of non-parties" rests "on grounds
of supervening social policy"; and that English restrictions on oral depostions suggest "that economizing on time and money has occupied a high place in the English scheme of priorities." Id. at 9.
62 446 U.S. 997, 999 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist).
63 The German Advantage, supra note 1, at 847.
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VII.

EXPERTS

Experts help courts draw inferences based upon specialized knowledge-for example, inferring speed from skid marks or paternity from
genetic evidence. In any legal system, courts will rely upon expert assistance in evaluating such evidence. Continental legal systems diverge
sharply from ours on how to select and instruct experts. In our system,
adversary selection and instruction of partisan experts is the overwhelmingly dominant pattern. In Continental systems, including the German,
judicial control of fact-gathering leads to court selection and instruction
of neutral experts.
The German Advantage minces no words about which is the better
approach on this matter. An expert hired to buttress a preordained position is engaged more in advocacy than in truth-seeking. Advocacy has
important virtues, which is why German procedure makes liberal provision for adversary participation in the system of selection, instruction,
and examination of neutral experts. But because advocacy is intrinsically
biased, it is no substitute for dispassionate scientific evaluation. "Short of
forbidding the use of experts altogether," The German Advantage laments, "we probably could not have designed a procedure better suited
to minimize the influence of expertise."64
A.

German Disdain

Because neutral expertise is central to German civil procedure, the
subject has given rise to practical treatises and scholarly literature. The
Critique's authors have rummaged through this material in an effort to
discredit the hugely successful German system. Their discussion is, once
again, distorted and error-riddled, but it is important to begin with a
different point. In all the German literaturethat these combative authors
reviewed, they could notfind one word of comparativepraisefor the AngloAmerican system. They could not find one proponent of replacing neutral expertise with an American-style clash of partisans. Knowledgeable
German jurists view our system of party-biased expertise with a mixture
of astonishment and contempt. Like Sherlock Holmes' dog that did not
bark, the dearth of German support is evidence that the Critique is not
telling a straight story. I turn now to some particulars of the Critique's
handling of expertise.
B. Adversary Safeguards
The Critique neglects to disclose that The German Advantage pays
particular attention to how the German Code of Civil Procedure has
designed the system of neutral expertise to protect the interests of litigants. The German Advantage explains that the selection process, while
64 Id. at 836.
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emphasizing scientific or professional merit, entails consultation with the
parties about potential experts.65 The article describes how the parties
may participate in the court's framing of questions for the expert. It
discusses the parties' opportunities to examine the court-appointed expert, to confront him with the views of adversary-selected experts, to
have the court-appointed expert's report supplemented, and otherwise to
challenge the report. 66 In explaining how the system guards against aberration, the article concludes:
When, therefore, a litigant can persuade the court that an expert's report
has been sloppy or partial, that it rests upon a view of the field that is not
generally shared, or that the question referred to the expert
is exceptionally
67
difficult, the court will commission further expertise.
The Critique is relentless in neglecting the ordinary incentives that
encourage thoroughness and moderation in the rendering of expertise.
The authors write: "Experts . . . have little incentive to report those
views that would undermine their own conclusions." 68 For "little," I
would substitute the word "every." An expert who concealed contrary
authority would invite exactly that kind of adversary rebuttal that the
German system of neutral expertise so carefully preserves.
C. Delegating
German legal scholarship can be notoriously conceptualistic. One
of the pleasant old chestnuts of German theoretical discussion is the
question of whether a judge who follows expert advice that he cannot
fully comprehend is delegating his office. The Critique cites some of this
stuff and scornfully concludes: "A system that is in substantial conflict
over the proper use of expert witnesses is not in a position to instruct
others on improvement. '69 The obvious point that the authors do not
acknowledge is that the underlying problem arises not from any defect of
German procedure, but from the intrinsic complexity of scientific knowledge. All legal systems require that the trier decide matters that turn
upon bodies of scientific knowledge that the trier does not command.
The Germans do the best that any system can with this dilemma. As the
65 Id. at 837-38.
66 Id. at 839-40. By contrast, I have elsewhere expressed reservations about the influence that
German prosecutors appear to exercise in the selection of psychiatric experts in criminal proceedings, and on the consequent risk that the affected party may have difficulty "overcom[ing] adverse
views of a court-appointed expert even if a contrary body of opinion exists." J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 76 (1977). The prosecutorial domination of the pre-

trial investigation that characterizes German criminal procedure is without counterpart in German
civil procedure. In civil procedure, as The German Advantage explains, the adversary balance seems
well suited to protecting litigants' interests in the selection of experts.
67 The German Advantage, supra note 1, at 840.
68 Critique,supra note 11, text following note 193.

69 Id. at text following note 169.
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authors acknowledge in a footnote, 70 a German court is expected to
probe an expert's report as best it can (aided, of course, by the adversary
submissions of the parties); but when such probing gives no cause for
disbelieving well-selected neutral expertise, the court may properly follow expert advice without purporting to master the body of scientific
knowledge upon which the expert's report rests. The authors make no
case for the view that the systematic bias of American adversary expertise-as opposed to German-style adversary vetting of neutral expertise-is a superior way to handle the problem.
D. Avoiding Expertise
The German Advantage remarks on the prominence of the expert in
the German tradition, and the Critique wants to spar about that. The
authors note that various respected German authorities recommend that
the courts avoid using experts unless necessary.7 1 This is completely correct and completely tautological. If you don't have reason to call for an
expert, you don't call for an expert.
E.

ProbingExpertise

The authors are schizophrenic about the level of probing of expertise
that German courts undertake. They cite data indicating that the courts
widely adopt expert findings and that only about ten percent of expert
reports provoke "critical discussion."'72 The authors bemoan this percentage but do not tell us why it is alarming. In a system that provides
high levels of party safeguard in the selection and instruction of experts-the theme that I emphasize in The German Advantage and that
the Critique persistently ignores-there is no obvious reason why nine
out of ten expert reports should not be worth adopting without "critical
discussion." Skid marks are skid marks, and blood types are blood types.
It is a fallacy to suppose that expertise must routinely fall within the zone
of contention.
A few paragraphs later, however, the authors take the opposite tack.
They point excitedly to a German supreme court opinion that criticizes a
73
lower court's handling of expertise in a medical malpractice case.
Rather than admit that the system is appropriately responsive to wellfounded criticism of expert reports, the authors declare that the German
supreme court "has recognized the problematic nature of 'neutral expertise.' "74 Thus, the Critiquetakes an approach of damned-if-you-do-anddamned-if-you-don't. The authors castigate the German courts for being
70 Id. at note 169 (discussing Bundesgerichtshof opinion of June 28, 1961).
71 Id. at text at notes 172-81.
72 Id. at text at note 185.

73 Id. at text at notes 200-01.
74 Id. at text following note 199.
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inadequately critical of expertise, while treating a court opinion that is
critical of expertise as a vote of no confidence in the system.
F

Science

To conclude their treatment of expertise, the authors descend to nihilism. Grandly lamenting that "Langbein does not address his epistemological views in this article," the authors nevertheless divine that "he
seems to possess a view of science and expertise that entails the pursuit of
rather simplistic 'objective' truth. '7 5 The epithet aside, that is exactly
my view of science and expertise, and it is all but universally shared.
Here is how the authors contest it:
Such a view is highly controversial, of course; in fact it is held by virtually
no respectable scientist or philosopher of which we are aware. Rather, the
contemporary conception of knowledge and its advancement is that both
come from the competition among differing paradigms and modes of
thoughts [citing,
inter alia, Kuhn's, The Structure of Scientific
76
Revolutions].
For all its affected learning, this passage embodies an elementary fallacy.
It conflates the rarefied realms of scientific revolutions with the mundane
world of settled knowledge. "Competition among differing paradigms"
hardly captures the world of skid mark experts, poured concrete experts,
ballistics experts, surveying experts, and the like. There is at any time a
consensus on most matters of scientific knowledge; if there were not, it
would be an act of extreme peril to drive a car, take an aspirin, buy a
house, or eat a tuna sandwich. The law courts deal with ordinary human
affairs, where, fortunately, the issues in dispute only exceptionally touch
scientific revolutions. And when, as The German Advantage explains, a
lawsuit does involve a field of unsettled knowledge, the German
proce77
dure promotes the hearing of discordant scientific views.
In a similar vein, the Critique'sauthors purport to see no difference
between the situation in which scientists disagree concerning unresolved
questions of scientific knowledge, and the situation in which experts are
paid to bolster opposing sides of a lawsuit. The authors approvingly
quote another writer for the view that scientists "'already operate in an
adversarial manner,' " with "'claims and counterclaims, arguments and
counterarguments ....
"-78 But a world of difference exists between
good faith scientific debate and the perverse incentives that arise when
experts are paid to buttress preordained positions. In litigation, victory is
winning for the moment; in scientific debate, where adjudication does not
occur, reputational incentives press far more for accuracy. Money dis75
76
77
78

Id. at text preceding note 203.
Id. at note 204 and accompanying text.
See supra, text acccompanying notes 66-67.
Critique,supra note 11, at 205 (quoting Loftus, Ten Years in the Life ofan Expert Witness, 10

L. & HUM. BEHAV. 259-60 (1986)).
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torts. That is why the convention is so strong that a scholar who, in a
scholarly publication, advances a position that he first developed as a
hireling, should disclose his former or continuing affiliation with his
sponsor.
Indeed, for an object lesson in the corrupting power of adversary
expertise, Ronald Allen need only look out the window to Northwestern's great medical school, where a professor of gynecology has just been
indicted for perjury in the Dalkon Shield case. According to the New
York Times report, the accused, who was paid $277,000 in fees to consuit and testify for the defendant, initially claimed to have conducted
experiments in support of his testimony, then admitted he had not.79 Exceptional though such a scandal undoubtedly is, it reveals a fundamental
difference between American and German procedure. Such scandals do
not happen in Germany, because court-appointed experts are not being
paid to buttress litigants' positions.
VIII.

JUDGES

Because the greater judicial responsibility for fact-gathering in German procedure necessarily imports greater judicial authority, the question arises whether the system contains appropriate safeguards. In The
German Advantage, I point to the main safeguards upon which the
Germans rely. First, there is constant adversary oversight, 80 which both
deters judicial misconduct and facilitates appeal. Second, the system of
appellate review is of central importance, both in deterring error below
and in correcting it above.8 The German standard of review is astonishingly liberal-in the first appellate instance, there is review de novo. Ap8 2
peals are heard by experienced panels, specialized by subject matter.
Third, the judicial career is meant to embody "incentives for diligence
and excellence. The idea is to attract very able people to the bench, and
to make their path of career advancement congruent with the legitimate
interests of the litigants. ' 83 The Critique leaves unanswered the discussion of adversary safeguard and appellate review, but the authors have
collected a wheelbarrow of sociological muck to hurl at the German
judiciary.
A. JudicialSelection
The authors fault The German Advantage for not adventuring
among some German sociological writing about the judiciary. For exam79 ProfessorIs Chargedwith Lying for Maker of Birth Control Device, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1988,

at 1, col. 1.
80 See supra text accompanying note 1; The German Advantage, supra note 1, at 834-35, 845.
81 Id. at 855-57.
82 For an English-language account, see Meador, Appellate Subject Matter Organization: The
German Designfrom an American Perspective, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REv.27 (1981).
83 The German Advantage, supra note 1, at 848.
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pie, the authors fret at the sociologists' discovery that the members of
this learned profession tend to come disproportionately "from families of
civil servants," to be more Catholic than the population at large, and to
be "oriented" (whatever that means) "toward traditionally conservative
and hierarchical groups such as clergymen .... -84
More seriously, the authors dispute a passage that I quoted from
Manfred Wolf, a leading German writer on judicial administration, that
"only the candidates with the best examination results have any chance
of entering the judicial corps."'8 5 The authors strain to belittle this point,
on the curious ground that, relative to the supply of new law graduates,
the number of vacancies in the judiciary is small. The small number of
places, they argue, is "the primary reason why the judiciary is now able
to hire distinguished graduates," and not "the attraction of a high status
career."' 86 This unlikely conjecture about what motivates able young jurists to join the judiciary would, even if accepted for the sake of argument, scarcely detract from the significance of the phenomenon that the
authors want to denigrate: The better German law graduates go disproportionately into the judiciary.
Straining to disparage the quality of recruits to the German bench,
the authors make much of some 1972 survey data contained in a study
(probably unpublished), whose revealing title is "Selfknowledge and
Political Consciousness of Jurists."' 87 The study reports on responses to a
questionnaire that was sent to some German judges, and to a minute
sample of lawyers. The respondents were asked to disclose their examination results, and the study tabulates the responses. The Critique reads
the survey results to stand for the proposition that the law graduates with
the higher examination grades did not unambiguously prefer the judiciary. 88 In truth, the sample employed in that study is highly suspect,
which may explain why the study was unable to attract a publisher. The
study suffers the familiar defects of poor questionnaire work. Many German judges feel that they have better things to do with their time than to
respond to questionnaires from sociologists researching the supposed
84
85
86
87

Critique,supra note 11, text at notes 212-15.
Id., text at note 224 (citing The German Advantage, supra note 1, at 849).
Critique, supra note 11, text preceding note 224.
Id. at note 220 and accompanying text (citing M. RIEGEL, R. WERLE, & R. WILDENMANN,
SELBSTVERSTXNDNIS UND POLITISCHES BEWUSSTSEIN DER JURISTEN [translation: SELFKNOWLEDGE AND POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF JURISTS] (1974)). The Critique cites this work as

though it were a book. The work is so obscure that (1) no copy exists in any of the hundreds of
North American libraries whose holdings are included in the RLN and OCLC data bases; and (2)
not one review of the work, German or otherwise, can be traced in the Index to Foreign Legal
Periodicals. For cite checking, the Critique's authors supplied photocopies of a title page and of
several pages of discontinuous and largely unexplained computer-generated tables (which apparently

tabulate responses to questionnaires), accompanied by typescript text. The title page discloses no
publisher, and I infer that the study was not published in the ordinary sense. Accordingly, this is not
work that has been subjected to conventional scholarly scrutiny.
88 Critique,supra note 11, text at note 226.
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political consciousness of the bench, with the result that the group that
responded is scarcely likely to have been representative. This problem of
unrepresentative data is especially acute within the study's tiny sample of
practicing lawyers: The entire sample contains 132 responses, from lawyers who self-selected themselves from a group of only 215 who were
solicited. Yet from this minuscule sample, the Critique'sauthors rush to
trumpet the possibility "that the practicing bar, and not the judiciary,
attracted a disproportionate number of the most highly qualified
graduates." 8 9
A good indication that the Critique'sauthors are abusing the 1972
study is that Werle, one of the study's three authors, thinks that the data
shows the opposite of what the Critique makes it stand for. Werle wrote
in a 1977 book: "It is striking that, especially in the second state examination, the lawyers (Anwdlte) performed worse than the judges and the
law graduates going into governmental administration (Verwaltungsjuristen)."90 Gerhard Kbler, writer of a prominent German introduction to legal studies, reports in the third edition of his book that as of
1981 judicial vacancies were being filled almost entirely with applicants
from the top twenty percent of the examination class. 9 1
The proposition that you need good examination results in order to
join the bench is a truism in Germany, roughly comparable to the notion
that the sun rises in the East. One needs to be very unsophisticated about
the German legal system in order to attempt to controvert so basic a
truth; and one needs to be very headstrong in order to rest such an attempt on a lone, obscure, and defective sociological survey.
The Critique canvasses some all-law-is-politics tracts of the early
seventies and cites them
for the proposition that Germans wish they had
"'political' judges."' 92 The Critique thus continues to display its instinct
for sampling error, in this instance accepting as gospel the discontents of
German flower children.
Recall the proposition advanced in The German Advantage: that
the effort to attract and to promote an able judiciary succeeds at a level
sufficient to constitute a real safeguard for litigants. The German Advantage does not recommend importing the German bench. "I do not believe," the article says, "that we would have to institute a German-style
89 Id., text at note 232. The Critique makes much of the point that few people with grades in the
two highest categories (sehrgut, gut) wound up on the bench, but that is because the absolute numbers of such grades were and always are extremely small.
90 R. WERLE, JUSTIZORGANISATION UND SELBSTVERSTANDNIS DER RICHTER: EINE EMPIRISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG 55 (1977).

91 G. K6BLER, DAS STUDIUM DES RECHTS: EIN WEGwEISER 237 (3d ed., 1982). The key
sentence reads: "On account of the growing number of applicants, the examination grade necessary
for admission [to the judicial corps] has risen (in 1981 almost entirely applicants with the grade of
"fully satisfactory" (vollbefriedigend) [or better]." Id. A table, id. at 114, shows that 20.3 percent
of the 1980 examination grades were "fully satisfactory" or better.
92 Critique,supra note 11, text at notes 249-50.
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career judiciary in order to reform American civil procedure along German lines .... -93 Again: "EMleasures far short of adopting the Continental career judiciary can bring about material improvement."' 94 Thus,
the contention that Germans "express grave doubts about the model that
Langbein extols" 95 is doubly misleading. I have not advocated wholesale
adoption of a German-style bench, and the German literature is wholly
devoid of admiration for American judicial selection practices. The common observation in Germany-that it would be nice if the people who
staff the career bench could have broader life experience before they enter
the bench-seems both sound and relatively trivial. It has tempted no
one in Germany to yearn for American-style judicial selection.
Small wonder. In the very months when Ronald Allen, sitting in
Chicago, was putting the finishing touches on the Critique,the local press
was reporting the latest roundup of judicial thugs. In December 1987,
four more circuit court judges were indicted for racketeering. 96 Simultaneously, the Texaco litigation was unfolding, bringing to national attention the corruption of campaign finance in the Texas bench. 9 7 Yet what
impresses the authors of the Critique is that some Germans think that it
would be a good idea for their judges to have broader pre-professional
experience. I wish Americans had the luxury to worry about such
matters.
B. Promotion
The Critique also declares itself mistrustful of the German effort to
encourage judicial diligence through the promotion process. Ever ready
to abandon its taste for empiricism when convenient, the Critique takes
at face value another early-seventies tract, this one by a probationary
judge who evidently washed out, became a sociologist, and wrote disparagingly of his former colleagues. 98
As usual, the Critique draws all inferences against the German system. Encouraging good caseload management becomes, in the eyes of
the Critique, "docket clearing ... at the expense of just resolution of
cases." 99 The pride that the Germans take in encouraging judges to
work within a predictable system of case law is dismissed contemptuously as "adhering in a narrow and technical fashion to the pronounce93 The German Advantage, supra note 1, at 854.
94 Id.
95 Critique, supra note 11, text at note 236.
96 Greylord Indictments Hit Suburban Court, Chicago Tribune, Dec. 10, 1987, at 1, col. 2.
97 "Lawyers representing Pennzoil [the plaintiff] contributed, from 1984 to early [1987], more
One of those lawyers
than $355,000 to the nine [Texas] Supreme Court justices sitting today ....
for Pennzoil had contributed $10,000 to the lower-court judge who later presided at the start of the
state-court trial in Houston." Petzinger & Solomon, Quality of.Justice" Texas Case Spotlights Questions on Integrity of the Courts in Texas, Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
98 See Critique, supra note 11, text at notes 252-55.
99 Id., text preceding note 256.
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ments of the higher courts ... ."0 Of course, if the Germ'an system had
shown an opposite tendency, it would have been criticized for tolerating
arbitrary power in the hands of inferior judges.
The German system of promotion takes account of peer evaluations
by senior colleagues, as well as objective factors such as reversal rates
and caseload management. Peer evaluations arise naturally from the collegial character of German courts. Not only the appellate courts, but
also the basic first-instance courts for substantial matters, sit in chambers
of three or more judges; and one judge serves as the presiding judge. 10 1
The Critique denounces the use of peer evaluations, which have routine
analogues in civil service careers and business careers everywhere, not to
mention academic careers. Within the German judiciary, however, the
authors think that peer review is "an instrument of power in the hands of
the presiding judges," tempting junior judges "to defer to the views of the
presiding judge ... ."102 Oddly, no mention is made of the practice,
reported in The German Advantage, that protects junior judges from
abuse: "[T]he young judges are rotated through various chambers in the
course of their careers, and this reduces the influence of an aberrant rat10 3
ing from any one presiding judge."'
Incident to its castigation of the German bench, the Critique voices
loud complaint about the narrowness of German case law, 104 a subject
far removed from The German Advantage. English-language readers interested in this subject should consult the work of the great American
comparative lawyer, John Dawson, which expresses an opposite concern-about the excessive creativity of German case law.105
IX.

CONCLUSION

The German Advantage was meant to inspire serious discussion
about issues of great magnitude in civil procedure. I hardly expect universal agreement from American scholars on the superiority of principles
that diverge so sharply from those that are familiar to us. A stimulating
article by Samuel Gross, taking issue with The German Advantage on the
question of whether the superior efficiency of German procedure is a de100

Id., text at note 256.
101 Although the first-instance Landgericht is collegial, the tendency of recent years has been to
increase the responsibility of a single judge within the chamber for routine adjudication. See The
German Advantage, supra note 1, at 827 n.13. For English-language discussion, in addition to the
sources there cited, see A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 157-59 (2d ed.

1977).
102 Critique,supra note 11, text at note 265.
103 The German Advantage, supra note 1, at 850.
104 Critique, supra note 11, text at note 261.
105 Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts" Germany, 63 B.U.L. REv. 1039, 1095
(1983).
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sideratum, 10 6 exemplifies constructive scholarly discourse and disagreement.
The trouble with the Critique is that it mirrors the vices of the legal
system it volunteers to defend: It is a work of adversary distortion. It
persistently misrenders what The German Advantage says while misdescribing the reality of German procedure. In this reply, I have tried
where possible to cite English-language literature, in order to allow readers who are not German-speaking the opportunity to confirm that the
account of German procedure in The GermanAdvantage is both accurate
and conventional.
In deciding whether to write this reply, I took counsel in several
quarters. The most worrisome advice came from a wise colleague on
another law faculty, who said: "The trouble with replying to a work of
distortion is that they can always distort afresh in a new round." I ask
readers to learn from the first round that these authors are not trustworthy guides to the work of others, or to the reality of German procedure.
Read The German Advantage for yourself; do not take these people's
word for what it says; for as I have so often shown in this paper, it typically says something quite different.
Ronald Allen is not alone in feeling threatened by the model of German civil procedure. The German achievement calls into question fundamental premises of our deeply flawed system of civil procedure. It
merits careful study, not the reckless trashing that these authors have
undertaken.

106 Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 734
(1987).
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